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Abstract
This paper summarizes some of my recent work on consumer protection. I present
three theoretical models which illustrate the merits and drawbacks of a number of
common consumer protection policies, namely: policies which prevent rms from
setting unduly high prices; policies which prevent rms requiring on-the-spot decision
making by prospective customers, and policies which prevent suppliers from paying
commission payments to sales intermediaries.
1 Introduction
The objective of both consumer and competition policy is to deliver well-functioning mar-
kets, something which requires both a strong supply side (competition) and a strong de-
mand side (consumers). For many products, vigorous competition is the single best protec-
tion for consumers, and only minimal consumer protection (general contract law, forbidding
deceptive marketing, the ability to return faulty goods, and so forth) is needed. As Muris
(2002), a former Chairman of the FTC, writes: [R]obust competition is the best single
means for protecting consumer interests.However, in some markets some consumers do
not always obtain a good deal, even when substantial competition is present, and in such
cases additional policies to aid consumers have a role to play.
This paper was prepared for the conference on The pros and cons of consumer protection, organized
by the Swedish Competition Authority, held in Stockholm on 11 November 2011. I am very grateful to
my discussant, Russell Damtoft, for his insightful comments.
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What prevents markets from delivering good outcomes to consumers? Familiar reasons
include abuse of dominance and collusion between suppliers, and these fall broadly within
the domain of competition policy. However, there are several other reasons why competi-
tion need not work well, such as imperfect information about product attributes, imperfect
information about market prices, supplier costs of advertising, consumers possessing im-
perfect information about their own needs, or the use of high-pressure and misleading sales
tactics. These features fall broadly under the heading of consumer policy.
It seems hard to dene precisely competition policyversus consumer policy. Motta
(2004, page 30) suggests that competition policy comprises the set of policies and laws
which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way as to
reduce economic welfare.Whereas according to Vickers (2004) one might dene consumer
policy in terms of the fundamental problems it seeks to prevent, cure, or remedy, which are:
(i) duress and undue sales pressure; (ii) information problems pre-purchase; and (iii) undue
surprises post-purchase. Nevertheless, many policies (such as those which act to reduce
consumer search costs or switching costs, or which reduce industry advertising costs) could
be said to fall under both headings.
For better or worse, there has been a lot more economics informing competition policy
than consumer policy. However, in recent years economists have shown a greater interest
in consumer policy. In part, this is because the economics profession has recently been
energized by behavioral economics, a branch of the discipline which takes into account
imperfect consumer decision making consumers can be less rational, more prone to various
biases and temptations.
This paper summarizes for a relatively non-technical audience my own recent work on
the economics of consumer protection, which has been done in collaboration with John
Vickers and Jidong Zhou.1 For the most part, and unlike the other papers presented at
this conference, this work models consumers as rational agents, and as such it provides
rationales for consumer policy which do not need to use recent models of behavioral con-
sumers. In the following sections I present three theoretical models which illustrate the
merits and drawbacks of a number of familiar consumer protection policies. First, pre-
venting rms from setting unduly high prices in markets such as credit cards, energy or
international mobile telephony may reduce a consumers incentive to investigate their mar-
1For more wide-ranging surveys on the economics of consumer protection, see Vickers (2004) and
Armstrong (2008). For an advanced exposition of theoretical models which model consumers as having
bounded rationality (and rms as prot-maximizing), see Spiegler (2011).
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ket thoroughly. The resulting model hazardmay well induce rms to raise their prices.
As such, a safeguard price cap of this form may be a kind of protection which consumers
do not need (although it would be welcomed by rms).
Second, policy sometimes aims to prevent rms from rushing their customersdecision
making. Sellers may have an incentive to force potential customers to decide then and
there whether to buy the product, before the customer has a chance to investigate other
perhaps superior deals available in the market. When a seller uses this particular sales
technique, the result may be a poor match between the consumer and product. In addition,
the practice may also lead the seller to set a higher price, which provides another source
of consumer harm. While a direct ban on this form of rm behavior may be hard to
implement, other common consumer policies such as mandated cooling o¤periods may
have the same end result.
Third, in many markets intermediaries act to recommend or otherwise pusha par-
ticular product to consumers. Examples include salesmen giving advice about nancial
products, doctors giving medical advice, or retailers which make prominent certain prod-
ucts in their shop displays. A common arrangement is for suppliers to pay commission to
an intermediary which gives the latter a reward in the event of a sale. A natural worry
is that the intermediary then promotes the product which comes with the highest com-
mission, rather than the product which is best for the consumer. In the model discussed,
the use of per-sale commission payments acts to raise prices in the market, relative to a
market in which consumers pay the intermediary directly for advice, or where uniformed
consumers shop randomly.
2 Consumer Protection and Moral Hazard
If consumers are over-protected in their market transactions, moral hazardmay ensue
and they may not pay su¢ cient attention to making the best choices. As is well under-
stood, if someone is insured, she will take less care protecting her possessions. An e¢ cient
insurance contract will trade o¤ the benets of insurance to risk-averse consumers with
the need to ensure that the consumer takes adequate care. Likewise, in markets with com-
plex products or with many suppliers, the consumer needs to invest e¤ort to choose what
product is the best for her. For instance, if policy ensures the consumer will face no bad
surprises in the small print (of a contract with a bank, for instance), she may be less likely
to read the contract at all. As Posner (1969, page 67) put it: Just as the cheapest way to
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reduce the incidence of certain crimes, such as car theft, is by inducing potential victims
to take simple precautions (locking car doors), so possibly the incidence of certain frauds
could be reduced at least cost to society by insisting that consumers exercise a modicum
of care in purchasing, rather than by placing restrictions on sellersmarketing methods.
It seems plausible that consumers learn market skills over time and, moreover, these
market skills are often not specic to one market, but spill over to many markets. For
instance, the victim of a scam, or an unexpectedly high credit card penalty charge, will
usually be more vigilant in future. It does not take many bad experiences with scams to
learn the maxim that if it seems too good to be true, it probably is.Unless a consumer
is particularly vulnerable or the product is particularly harmful, it is probably best to let
consumers develop their own imperfect rules of thumb to defend themselves in the market.
Some consumers will no doubt harm themselves by inexpertly cooking a chicken (say, by
not reading the small print of the cooking instructions), but the solution is not to remove
raw chicken from the market. The general point is that excessive consumer protection may
be inimical to the development of market skills in consumers.2
To take a specic example, a consumer policy which acts directly to limit price dis-
persion in such a market could have perverse e¤ects. If price dispersion is reduced, this
reduces the incentive for a consumer to become informed, and so is likely to reduce the
number of informed consumers. The net result of reduced consumer search could well be
that average prices in the market rise rather than fall, thus harming consumers.
Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) provide formal modelling of this idea.3 Our mar-
ket model was an extension of Burdett and Judd (1983), who studied a model where all
consumers are rational, and decide whether or not to become better informed about the
deals available in the market on the basis of the expected gains from doing so. Armstrong
et al. assumed the market had a large number of identical rms which supply a homoge-
2However, just because there is moral hazard does not mean insurance should not be o¤ered at all.
One might balk at permitting sales to the general public of Japanese pu¤ersh, which is fatal if prepared
even slightly incorrectly. A related issue is the widespread use of use-bydates on food. Many consumers
never use food beyond its use-by date. Given that the use-by date is chosen so that the foodstu¤ is
almost certain to be edible regardless of local conditions (e.g., how often the consumers fridge is opened),
it is plausible that ine¢ ciency arises from this policy. If use-by dates were less widespread (say, in the
days when many consumers purchased meat from a butcher rather than a supermarket), consumers would
likely have better skills in detecting whether food is edible (e.g., by smell). This is another instance of how
arguably excessive protection leads consumers to possess too few market skills.
3Much earlier, Fershtman and Fishman (1994) examined the impact of a price cap and showed that the
price cap could act to raise expected prices.
4
neous product to a large number of consumers. For simplicity, the rmscost of supply is
normalized to zero. Consumers are risk-neutral, and all have maximum willingness-to-pay
for a unit of the product equal to v. Consumers are endogenously divided into two groups
according to their choice of search technology: the better informed and the less informed.
The former observe more prices on average than the latter, but incur a one-o¤ search cost
when they choose to become better informed.
In such a market, rms choose their prices randomly and there is price dispersion.4
In such a market, a consumer who sees more prices will, on average, nd a lower price
than a consumer observing fewer prices. Suppose that in market equilibrium an informed
consumers expected price is denoted PI , a less-informed consumers expected price is
PU > PI , and the fraction of consumers who choose to become informed is . Suppose
a consumer can choose to use the superior search technology by incurring a (possibly
psychological) cost s  0. In general, consumers may di¤er in their cost of acquiring
information, and let s() be the search cost of the marginal consumer when  consumers
choose to be informed. (The function s() is necessarily weakly increasing.) In general, the
two expected prices PI and PU are decreasing functions of  (as illustrated for a related
model in section 4 below on Figure 1). For a consumer with search cost s to be willing to
become more informed, we require that s  PU  PI so that it is worthwhile to spend s to
discover more prices. In equilibrium, consumers will choose to become informed until the
nal consumer is indi¤erent. Thus, the fraction  of consumers who become well informed
in equilibrium satises
PU()  PI() = s() :
To illustrate this discussion, consider an example where the less-informed consumers
see just one price, while the more-informed consumers see two prices. If all consumers
have search cost s = v=20, one can show that approximately 95% of consumers choose to
become informed. All consumers make the expected payment (including search costs for
those consumers who choose to become informed) of PU = PI + s  v=10.
Consider a policy which aims to protect less informed consumers against unduly high
prices. (For instance, a usury law might take this form in a particular credit market, or
4More precisely, this requires that there be some of each kind of consumer and that less informed
consumers sometimes see just a single price. To understand why rms cannot set predictable prices,
suppose to the contrary that each of a given rms rivals are known to set the price p. Then if p is above
marginal cost, the rm can make more prot by slightly undercutting this price, and so selling to all
consumers who see its price. If the price p is equal to marginal cost, then the rm can make positive prot
by setting its price above cost and selling to those consumers who happen to see only its price.
5
consumer advocates might suggest such regulation in the energy or telecommunications
sectors if some consumers are found to be paying high prices.) That is to say, policy
constrains rms to set prices no higher than p, where p < v is the price cap. The imposition
of this price cap has pros and cons. If PI() and PU() are expected prices in the absence
of regulation, then Armstrong et al. show that the expected prices with price cap p become
respectively
p
v
PU() and
p
v
PI() :
Thus, for given , the intervention benets both the informed and the uninformed con-
sumers since the prices they pay are proportional to p. But the incentive to become
informed, i.e., the gap between the two expected prices, is also proportional to p for given
, and so the policy induces the number of informed consumers to fall.
Consider imposing the price cap p = v=2 in the above numerical example, so that
maximum allowed prices are halved. In this case the fraction of informed consumers falls
to   0:74, so that the number of uninformed consumers rises about 5-fold as a result of
the policy. Each consumer pays (p=v)PU , which is now increased by about 70% to 0:17v.
Industry prot more than doubles as a result of the imposition of the price cap. Thus, the
perversee¤ect of this particular consumer policy is substantial in this example.
Beyond this numerical example, when does imposing a price cap harm consumers? In
the special case where all consumers have the same search cost s, provided the price cap
is not so tight that all consumers cease searching, the imposition of a price cap is sure to
make all consumers pay higher expected prices. Thus, the numerical example is not a uke,
and is rather a robust phenomenon. Although the direct e¤ect of a price cap is to reduce
prices, the indirect e¤ect of reduced search lessens each rms demand elasticity so much
that prices on average go up. This formalises a claim sometimes made informally, which
is that imposing price controls on an oligopoly market could raise equilibrium prices. One
intuition for such a claim is that a price cap acts as a focal point for tacit collusion. For
instance, Knittel and Stango (2003) examine the credit card market in the United States
in the period 1979-89. There, usury laws in many states put a ceiling (often of 18%) on the
interest rates which credit cards could levy. Knittel and Stango (2003, Table 3) show how,
for much of this period, average interest rates were higher in those states with a ceiling than
in those states without any controls. They interpret this observation as evidence that price
caps can encourage tacit collusion via the policy-induced focal point. The search-theoretic
model in Armstrong et al., however, provides another way to interpret this data. In our
model, pricing is entirely non-cooperative, and tacit collusion plays no role. Rather, price
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controls soften competition by blunting consumersincentives to search for good deals.
If consumers di¤er in their costs of acquiring market information, imposing a price
cap causes fewer consumers to cease becoming informed. If the search cost curve s()
is su¢ ciently steep, a price cap will then benet consumers. Consider for instance the
limiting case where an exogenous fraction of consumers  are informed while the remaining
consumers are uninformed. This situation could be interpreted as there being a fraction
 of consumers have zero search cost and the remainder have an innite search cost; or
we could take a behavioural interpretation, that a fraction 1   of consumers are naive
and mistakenly believe there is no benet to shopping around. (This model is essentially
Varians (1980) model of sales.) When  is constant, the imposition of a price cap is
unambiguously benecial for both groups of consumers (since their expected prices fall),
and harms industry prots. Thus, we can conclude that the impact of a price cap on
consumer welfare depends in this model on the ne details of the distribution of search
costs in the population of consumers.
It would be useful in future work to extend this stylized model to richer settings. For
instance, it is not particularly common to impose caps on headline prices in oligopoly
markets. Rather, price controls might be applied to small printcharges in a contract, or
minimum quality standards might be imposed on aspects of product quality. It would be
worthwhile to extend this model so that consumers must expend e¤ort to understand these
less salient aspects of a rms o¤er. For instance, could the introduction of a minimum
quality standard sometimes lead to lower average quality in the market?
Armstrong et al. also consider an alternative setting in which consumers have the
ability to opt out of intrusive marketing. A popular consumer protection policy is to
introduce a do not call list, and when someone signs up to such a list marketers are
not permitted to make cold-calls to this person. Again, this policy sounds benecial to
consumers, as this form of marketing can be irritating. However, to the extent that this
form of marketing allows recipients to become more informed about deals available in the
market (albeit at the search cost of having to endure the marketing e¤orts), such a
policy again has pros and cons. Prices are pushed downwards when a greater proportion of
consumers are well informed, and so when many consumers choose to opt out of marketing
this impacts negatively on prices. The net result can be that consumers are harmed when
the do not call list is introduced. Indeed, rms may welcome this particular consumer
policy, as it relaxes price competition in their markets. (For the same reason, historically
rms have often supported measures which restrict price advertising.)
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3 Rushed Decision Making
One controversial sales method forces the consumer to decide quickly whether to buy.
Methods of encouraging a quick decision include a seller refusing to sell to a customer
unless she buys immediately, or in less extreme cases the seller tells the potential customer
that she will pay a higher price if she decides to purchase at a later date. In his account
of sales practices, Cialdini (2001, page 208) reports:
Customers are often told that unless they make an immediate decision to
buy, they will have to purchase the item at a higher price later or they will be
unable to purchase it at all. A prospective health-club member or automobile
buyer might learn that the deal o¤ered by the salesperson is good for that one
time only; should the customer leave the premises the deal is o¤. One large
child-portrait photography company urges parents to buy as many poses and
copies as they can a¤ord because stocking limitations force us to burn the
unsold pictures of your children within 24 hours. A door-to-door magazine
solicitor might say that salespeople are in the customers area for just a day;
after that, they, and the customers chance to buy their magazine package, will
be long gone. A home vacuum cleaner operation I inltrated instructed its sales
trainees to claim that, I have so many other people to see that I have the time
to visit a family only once. Its company policy that even if you decide later
that you want this machine, I cant come back and sell it to you.
A related example is the practice in some academic disciplines for journals to make ex-
ploding o¤ers to authors, requiring them to commit to publish with them before they nd
out whether other, perhaps better, journals are willing to publish their article. Because
of the ine¢ cient decision-making the use of exploding o¤ers induces, recently a number of
law journals have agreed to cease their practice of making exploding o¤ers to authors.5
A less extreme sales tactic is to o¤er a discount for immediate sale. A home improve-
ment company might o¤er its potential customers a regular price for the agreed service,
together with a discounted price if the customer agrees immediately. Similarly, a prospec-
tive tenant might be o¤ered an apartment for $900 per month but to whom the landlord
o¤ers $850 if she agrees immediately, or a car dealer tries to close a deal who o¤ers a
further $500 o¤ the price if the buyer accepts now, so (as he claims) he can then make his
sales quota for that month.
5See the letter published online at www.harvardlawreview.org/Joint-Letter.pdf.
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Inducements to make a quick decision can limit a consumers ability to make a well-
informed decision, which in turn can harm market performance. Public policy has at-
tempted to address this problem. For instance, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive,
adopted in 2005 across the European Union, prohibits in all circumstances Falsely stating
that a product will only be available for a very limited time, or that it will only be available
on particular terms for a very limited time, in order to elicit an immediate decision and
deprive consumers of su¢ cient opportunity or time to make an informed choice.However,
in practice the enforcement of such laws is often di¢ cult. A more e¢ cient method to tackle
the issue may sometimes involve less direct means. For example, exploding o¤ers could in
essence be prohibited by mandating a cooling o¤period, so that consumers have the right
to return a product within some specied time after agreeing to purchase. (They could
then return a product if they subsequently nd a preferred option.) Many jurisdictions
impose cooling o¤ periods for some products, especially those sold in the home.
Armstrong and Zhou (2011b) provide a formal model to examine a sellers incentive
to encourage rushed decisions, by discriminating against those customers who wish to buy
its products later. It is natural to study this issue in the context of sequential search,
where consumers search for a suitable product and/or for a low price.6 Of course, the
sales tactic only works in those situations where sellers can distinguish new visitors from
people who have returned to buy only after the initial sales pitch. In the majority of
markets this is not possible. (A supermarket, for instance, keeps no track of a consumers
entry and exit from the store.) Nevertheless, in many markets such discrimination is
feasible. A sales assistant may tell from a potential customers questions or demeanor
whether she has paid a previous visit or not, or may simply recognize her face. In online
markets, a retailer using tracking software may be able to tell if a visitor using the same
computer has visited the site before. Sometimes as with job o¤ers, automobile sales,
tailored nancial products, medical insurance, doorstep sales, or home improvements a
consumer needs to interact with a seller to discuss specic requirements, and this process
reveals the consumers identity.
6As mentioned in the introduction, we used a model with rational consumers. There are many other
methods to induce sales which rely on more psychological factors. These include attempts to make the
prospective buyer like the seller (e.g., by claiming similar interests, family or social background) or
attempts to make the buyer feel obligated to the seller (e.g., by means of a free gift). Cialdini describes
these and other sales techniques in more detail. However, it is often unclear what role consumer policy
has to play in combatting these kinds of sales tactics.
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In such situations, there are two reasons why a rm might wish to discriminate against
those consumers who buy later. First, there is a strategic reason, which is to deter a
potential consumer from going on to investigate rival o¤ers. If a consumer cannot return
to a seller once she leaves, this increases the opportunity cost of onward search, as the
consumer then has fewer options remaining relative to the situation in which return is
costless. Second, the observation that a consumer has come back to a seller after sampling
other options reveals relevant information about a consumers tastes or the prices she has
been o¤ered elsewhere, and this may provide a protable basis for price discrimination.
A seller may charge a higher price to those consumers who have already investigated
other sellers, because their decision to return indicates they are unsatised with rival
products. The former motive is most relevant when rms announce their buy-later policies
in advance (and stick to their policies), while the latter is more important when rms have
less commitment power.
A simple framework to think about these issues is the following. A single seller supplies
a product which yields gross utility u to a consumer, where u varies across consumers such
that the fraction of consumers with u  p is described by the demand function Q(p). The
key twist to the model is that the consumers outside option (her utility received if she
does not buy the sellers product), denoted by v, is a random variable which the consumer
does not know until she leaves the seller. (The parameter v might represent the uncertain
value of other deals available from alternative sellers, for instance.) If the seller chooses
price p, the consumers net surplus from the seller is u p. If the seller allows the consumer
to investigate her outside option before deciding whether to buy, the consumer will always
wait to discover the outside option (in case v happens to be large), and then return to buy
whenever u  p  v. With this method of selling, the probability that the consumer buys
its product is the expected value of demand, denoted EQ(p + v) (where the expectation
takes place with respect to the outside option v). If instead the seller forced the consumer
to decide to buy before she can nd out v, with price p the consumer with gross utility u
will accept this exploding o¤er whenever u p  Ev, where Ev is the expected value of the
outside option. (Here, we assume the consumer is risk-neutral.) Thus, the probability of a
sale with this high-pressure sales technique is Q(p+Ev). According to Jensens Inequality,
EQ(p+ v) is smaller than Q(p+Ev) if the demand curve Q() is concave over the relevant
range, and it is greater if the demand curve is convex.
Thus, in this simple setting, the incentive to make an exploding o¤er depends on the
shape of the sellers demand curve: with a concave demand curve the seller has an incentive
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to use this form of high-pressure selling.7 The basic trade-o¤ involved is as follows. When
the seller makes an exploding o¤er, this makes the consumer more likely to accept the o¤er
immediately if she likes it, but it prevents her, in the event that she has only a moderate
payo¤ from the o¤er, from coming back if she discovers her outside options is even worse.
When the demand curve is concave, the rst e¤ect dominates. For a given price p, the
consumer is harmed when the seller makes an exploding o¤er, since she obtains her ideal
outcome when free recall is allowed while an exploding o¤er leads to an ine¢ cient outcome
for many realizations of (u; v). In addition, the use of an exploding o¤er may induce the
seller to alter its chosen price; it will raise the price when an exploding o¤er is made if
the demand function Q(p + Ev) is less elastic than the demand function EQ(p + v). In
general, this comparison is ambiguous, and depends on the concavity or convexity of the
slope of demand. However, the typical pattern seems to be that the seller raises its price
when it makes an exploding o¤er. In such cases, the use of exploding o¤ers has a double
disadvantage: the tactic induces a poor match between consumers and products and it
raises the price consumer must pay.
While rms have an incentive to make an exploding o¤er in the relatively restrictive
case where the demand curve is concave, they have an incentive to o¤er a buy-now discount
much more widely. Indeed, Armstrong and Zhou (2011b) show that a rm has such an
incentive under the mild condition that the demand curve is log-concave. Although the
sales tactic is framed as a discount (e.g., buy my product now and youll save 10% o¤my
usual price), it turns out that when a rm engages in this form of price discrimination
both its prices often rise relative to a situation where the rm o¤ers a uniform price to its
customers. Again, in such cases the sales tactic induces a poor product match and higher
prices.
An alternative method of discriminating against prospective buyers who leave and then
return is to implement an unannounced price hike. When searching for air-tickets online, a
consumer may nd a quote on one website, go on to investigate a rival seller, only to return
7This result continues to hold even if the seller cannot commit not to serve a returning customer,
provided some consumers are credulousand believe the sales patter. In reality, a doorstep seller, say,
may be only too pleased to return to sell if a customer calls to say she does in fact want the item. In
such cases, the exploding o¤er is not a credible sales strategy. However, if some consumers do anyway
believe the salesmans claim that he is in the area that day only and the purchase decision must be
immediate, the salesman has an incentive to claim to make an exploding in order to inuence the decision
of these credulous consumers. (The sophisticated consumers are not taken in or otherwise a¤ected by the
salesmans claims.)
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to the original website to nd the price has mysteriously risen. Or a consulting rm may be
approached by a company wanting antitrust advice and a fee is chosen, but if the company
returns some weeks later after trying rival consultants (who are too expensive, or perhaps
turn out to be conicted), it may nd the fee has increased. To analyze such cases, we
relaxed the assumption that rms commit to their buy-later price when consumers make
their rst visit. Then it is often the case that the seller does wish to raise its initial price
when a consumer comes back to buy later.
For instance, suppose a consumer incurs a (possibly small) intrinsic cost r > 0 in order
to return to the seller after investigating the outside option. If the seller initially o¤ers the
price p and the consumer anticipates that this price will remain valid if she comes back to
buy later, then any consumer who buys later must have preferences such that u p r  v.
(If she is willing to come back, then her surplus at the seller, u p, must exceed the outside
option v by enough to compensate her cost of returning.) Therefore, the seller can raise its
price from p to p + r and not induce any of these returning consumers to be driven back
to the outside option. In fact, a similar argument shows that there can then be no buy-
later price which is accurately anticipated by consumers. It follows that the only credible
outcome when rms have no commitment power at all is that the seller makes an exploding
o¤er and the return market collapses. An inability to commit to its buy-later policy will
therefore amplify a rms incentive to discriminate against those consumers who buy later.
4 Commission-based Selling
As discussed in the two previous sections, consumers are often initially imperfectly informed
about the deals available, and must invest e¤ort to nd out where to obtain a reasonable
product at a reasonable price. A consumer may sift sequentially through the options
available until she nds one which is satisfactory (rather than the best available in the
market). In such a market, a seller has an advantage if it is encountered early on in a
consumers search process. In a few situations it makes sense to suppose that consumers
search randomly through available options, in which case no rm is privileged relative to
its rivals. In many circumstances, however, consumers consider options in a non-random
manner, and choose rst to investigate those sellers or products which have high brand
recognition, which are known to have a low price, which the consumer has purchased
previously, which are recommended by an intermediary, or which are prominently displayed
within a retail environment.
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Armstrong and Zhou (2011a, section 1.1) consider a setting where rms market their
products by o¤ering nancial inducements to intermediaries. The formal model assumed
that sellers could not observe or contract on the products the intermediary chooses to
promote, and to give an incentive to promote its product a seller pays a per-sale commission
fee to the intermediary. This sales method is often used in one-to-one sales environments
such as for nancial services. In this model, the intermediary chooses to recommend
the product which pays the highest commission, and uninformed consumers are steered
towards the more expensive product. This could be construed as a form of mis-selling.
Because sellers compete to become prominent by o¤ering high commissions, this pushes
up a sellers marginal cost of supply, and so equilibrium retail prices are high relative to a
market with random consumer search.
We studied a variant of Varian (1980) in which his framework is modied to allow a
single intermediary (or salesman for brevity in the following) to steer the uninformed
portion of consumers towards a particular product. In more detail, a number of symmetric
sellers costlessly supply a homogenous product (life insurance, say) which all consumers
value at v. We assume that this product must be sold via the salesman. An exogenous
fraction  of well-informed consumers costlessly observe the two retail prices, and buy from
the cheapest supplier. The remaining fraction 1  of consumers will only consider a single
product and buy that product if its price is below v. (These consumers may have very
high search costs, or are susceptible to the marketing e¤orts of the salesman and follow his
recommendation.) Hence, the salesman has the ability to steer these 1   uninformed (or
credulous) consumers to buy any particular product. Suppose that a rm chooses its
retail price, p, and commission rate, b, simultaneously (and simultaneously with its rivals).
This rm pays commission b to the salesman every time a sale of its product is made. We
assume that the salesman cannot levy charges on consumers, and so aims to maximize his
income from commission payments.
In this setting it is clear that the salesman will choose to promote the high-commission
product, regardless of how the two retail prices compare (as long as prices do not exceed v).
This is because the salesmans marketing e¤ort cannot inuence the choice of the informed
consumers at all, but fully determines the choice made by the uninformed consumers.
Hence, the salesman will direct the uninformed consumers towards the product which pays
a higher commission rate. It is also clear, as in the work described in section 2, that
sellers choose their retail prices and commission payments randomly. In the equilibrium,
there is an increasing relationship between a rms choice of b and p. This is because
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a higher price p makes it more worthwhile for a seller to pay the salesman to steer the
uninformed consumers towards its product. Moreover, this incentive also increases with
the proportion of uninformed consumers. Since high commissions are associated with high
retail prices, the salesman promotes the highly priced product due to the high commission
he then receives. This is a form of mis-selling, since uninformed (or credulous) consumers
are directed towards the more expensive product.
There are two natural benchmarks with which to compare the outcome when commis-
sions are paid. The rst benchmark is when there is no salesman, and the uninformed
consumers buy randomly from one of the rms. In this case the framework reduces ex-
actly to Varian (1980)s model. We show that retail prices are higher when rms pay
commissions to a salesman to promote their product relative to the situation with random
search. This is due to the competition between rms to o¤er high sales commissions to have
their product promoted, which articially inates the marginal cost of selling a product.
However, whether rms enjoy greater prots when they pay commission is ambiguous. In
the case of two suppliers, without commission payments each rm makes expected prot
1
2
(1   )v, while in the regime with commissions a rm makes expected prot (1   )v.
Thus, more prot is obtained with commission payments when  > 1
2
, so that the unin-
formed consumers are in the minority. But when the uninformed consumers are in the
majority, the two rms end up playing a prisoners dilemma due to the erce competition
to become prominent.
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Figure 1: Expected prices and commissions in three regimes
Figure 1 plots the expected prices paid in these two regimes as a function of , the
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proportion of informed consumers. (Here, v = 1.) The two bold lines depict expected
prices when commissions are paid, where the upper of these lines is the expected price paid
by the uninformed consumers and the lower line is the expected price paid by the informed
consumers. The dotted line represents the expected commission paid to the salesman. The
two feint lines depict the corresponding prices in Varians model where no commissions are
paid and search is random. The two regimes have the same outcome for consumers when
 = 0 (when the monopoly price p = v is chosen for sure) and when  = 1 (when the
competitive price p = 0 is chosen). However, for intermediate values of , the prices paid
in the commission regime are substantially higher than when no commissions are paid.
Indeed, in most cases an uninformed consumer in the no-salesman regime pays a lower
price than even the informed consumers do in the commission regime.
The second benchmark with which to compare the outcome with commission payments
is to suppose that the salesman is necessary for consumers to buy the product (unlike the
benchmark with random search), but now the salesman is paid by consumers rather than by
sellers.8 Suppose that when the salesman is paid by consumers, say in the form of a lump-
sum consultation fee, he directs the uninformed consumers to the cheaper product. (This
might be because, all else equal, he has a small intrinsic preference for recommending the
appropriate product to consumers.) In this case, all consumers buy the cheaper product and
in Bertrand fashion the sellers are forced to set retail prices equal to cost. Thus, suppliers
are harmed when this policy is introduced, relative to both the commission regime and the
random search regime. The outcome for consumers depends on how much they have to
pay the salesman for his advice. One assumption is that the consultation fee is set equal
to the revenue the salesman received under the commission regime, so that the salesman is
indi¤erent between the two regimes. (Perhaps the advice industry needs to be supportive
of a policy shift from a commission-based model to a consumer-fee model.) In this case,
the expected total price the price for the product plus the fee to the salesman paid by
any consumer is simply the dotted line on Figure 1. From the gure it follows that all
consumers are better o¤ when they pay the salesman compared to when suppliers pay the
salesman. In fact, they are also better o¤ when they pay the salesman than when they
search randomly (where prices are the feint lines on the gure).
This section has described a model where rms attempt to inuence a salesmans mar-
8The UK regulator, the Financial Services Authority, published rules in March 2010 concerning how
nancial advice can be remunerated. The rules state that an advisor will not be able to accept commission
for recommending products, and the consumer fee for advice must be agreed between the consumer and
the advisor, rather than between the seller and the advisor.
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keting e¤orts by means of per-sale commission payments. The salesman gives prominence
to the product which pays the highest commission, and in equilibrium this entails steering
uninformed consumers towards the more expensive product. Competition between sell-
ers to set the highest commission means that the marginal cost of supply is inated and
equilibrium retail prices are high. Therefore, the outcome for consumers, both informed
and uninformed, is poor: worse than the situation without commission payments where
the uninformed shop randomly, and far worse than the situation in which consumers pay
directly for advice. This model therefore gives some support to consumer policies which
restrict the use of commission payments as a marketing tactic.9
This discussion considered an environment in which sellers could not observe the mar-
keting e¤orts of the intermediary, and so induced e¤ort from the intermediary with the
use of per-sale commissions. A by-product of this arrangement is that a sellers marginal
cost of supply is articially inated, and consumers are harmed by high retail prices which
result. In other environments, sellers can observe the intermediarys marketing strategy,
and so there is no need to give incentives ex post for the intermediary to promote the
product. (For instance, a publisher can observe whether a bookstore does in fact promote
its book as the book of the month.) As such, it is then often more natural to suppose
that payments for promotion are lump-sum rather than per-sale, with the result that retail
prices are not necessarily adversely a¤ected.10 Indeed, as discussed in Armstrong and Zhou
(2011a, section 1.2), lump-sum payments for product promotion may actually be welfare-
enhancing, as sellers with better (or cheaper) products may well be prepared to pay the
most for being promoted in this way, and so consumer will end up being guided in the
appropriate direction.
9Inderst and Ottanviani (2011) present an alternative model of potential mis-selling, where the salesman
advises consumers about the suitability of a product rather than its price. There, no consumers are
informed, and must rely on the salesman to advise them about which product to buy. The salesman has
only a noisy signal about the suitability of a product, and he has an intrinsic preference to recommend
the suitable product to a consumer. However, this preference can be overturned if sellers set high enough
commissions.
10One UK bookstore was alleged in 2006 to charge publishers £ 50,000 a week to guarantee a book a
prominent position in the stores 542 high street shops and inclusion in catalogues and other advertising.
A trade body suggested that 70 per cent of publisher promotional budgets were spent on so-called below-
the-lineschemes operated by bookshops rather than more traditional advertising. For more details, see
the article in the (UK) Sunday Times by Robert Winnett and Holly Watt titled £ 50,000 to get a book
on recommended list, 28 May 2006.
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5 Concluding Comments
I have presented three theoretical models which aim to shed light on the pros and cons of a
number of common consumer protection policies. We saw that some support could be given
to policies which seek to prevent rushed decision making and which seek to control the use
of per-sale commission payments as a method of giving incentives to sales intermediaries.
In both of these cases, it was not clear from the models whether more competitionwould
be another way to solve these problems. We also saw how an apparently pro-consumer
policy which limits maximum prices in the market might backre, and lead rms to raise
their average prices.
These policies fall under the headings of combatting either (i) sales pressure or (ii)
information problems before purchase (using the taxonomy in Vickers (2004)). In future
work it will important to understand better the problems which emerge with (iii) surprises
after purchase. For instance, in what circumstances should regulation control terms in the
small printof consumer contracts, and if so, how should it do so? For example, many
consumers are known to overlook contractual terms such as unauthorized overdraft charges
levied by banks, or call charges levied by mobile telephone networks when a subscriber
makes more calls than their allowance. Is there a role for consumer policy to control these
charges, and if so, at what level? To what extent is the moral hazard problem analyzed in
section 2 likely to re-emerge with small print regulation?
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